College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

1979

Making Sense of Desegregation and Affirmative
Action
William W. Van Alstyne
William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Van Alstyne, William W., "Making Sense of Desegregation and Affirmative Action" (1979). Faculty Publications. 727.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/727

Copyright c 1979 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Book Review
Making Sense of Desegregation and
Affirmative Action
FROM BROWN TO BAKKE-THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978. By J. Harvie Wilkinson III.t New York:
Oxford University Press, 1979. Pp. ix, 368. $17.95.
COUNTING

RACE: EQUALITY FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO
AND WEBER. By Terry Eastland:j: and William J. Bennett.tt New York: Basic Books, 1979. Pp. x, 243. $10.95.
BY

BAKKE

Reviewed by William Van Alstyne*
Mr. Wilkinson has clerked for Mr. Justice Powell, taught (and
published) as an associate professor of law at the University of Virginia, and currently serves as editor of the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot.
From Brown to Bakke, 1 his review of our tumultuous quarter-century
of school integration, reflects these touch points of personal biography,
both for better and for worse.
"For better" in respect to a good and useful number of things. The
title speaks accurately of the subject and Mr. Wilkinson's book establishes an independent claim for itself. His subject is not race relations
at large. Neither is it still another assessment of "the Second Reconstruction." Mr. Wilkinson does not draw within his discussion a review
of Supreme Court developments in related areas of race relations and
constitutional law during the past quarter-century, and he makes very
little use of the proliferating Acts of Congress and acts of executive
discretion during the same period. The book's focus is the Supreme
Court and public school integration, and that focus is maintained
sharply. The manner in which the principal decisions are illuminated
t Editor, Virginian-Pilot, Norfolk, Virginia.
:j: Editorial Page Editor, The Greensboro Record, Greensboro, North Carolina.
tt Director, National Humanities Center, Research Triangle, North Carolina.
• William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1955, University of Southem California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University.
1. J. WiLKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE-THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979) [hereinafter cited as J. WiLKINSON].
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by the practical, legal, and political difficulties at each step of the way
provides a very well-informed perspective that is both interesting and
important.
After a brief introduction of events from the original apartheid
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson/ and of the graduate school decisions
that marked its erosion between 1938 and 1950,3 Mr. Wilkinson reaches
Brown v. Board of Education 4 by page twenty-six. The ensuing chapters move briskly through "Brown II,'' 5 the principal decisions of the
early 1960s6 (pursuant to which very little desegregation occurred), and
the stiffening of judicial attitude in 1968 that required prompt dismantling of racially dual school systems: "to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."1
With solid attention to.the role of the federal district and circuit courts
in the South during this period, Mr. Wilkinson also suitably develops
the diverse interpretations of the original Brown decision, which first
led the Fourth and the Fifth Circuits toward quite different courses of
action-the Fourth Circuit originally requiring little beyond the discontinuance of compulsory state-directed school segregation in the
Carolinas, Maryland, and Virginia, and the Fifth Circuit directing
more aggressive court-ordered remedies to achieve a degree of school
mtegration that might ordinarily have been expected but for previous
and persistent state-orchestrated segregation. 8
With Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 9 in
1971, the Supreme Court unanimously sustained as within the discretion of a careful district judge the fashioning of a busing decree to secure significant desegregation within a very large, formerly de jure
segregated school district in a state well accustomed to using that very
means over a long period of time to maintain and to entrench racial
apartheid. Mr. Wilkinson appropriately recognizes Swann (as have
others) as the apogee of Supreme Court resolve and involvement.
After Swann, just as the Warren Court's reapportionment decisions had
reached ultimate stopping places (lest they 'Overrun the constitutional
2. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
3. Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
u.s. 629 (1950).
4. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
s: Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
6. Goss v. Board ofEduc., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (per curiam).
7. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
8. Compare Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cer/. denied, 353 U.S. 910
(1957), with United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
9. 402 u.s. 1 (1971).
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justifications that brought about the original decisions), the doctrinal
barriers to further judicial innovation became more complex and formidable. The decisions after Swann are plainly marked by a sense of
growing perplexity and dimming efficacy. Mr. Wilkinson notes them
very well, neglecting neither the doctrinal problems, the demographic
realities, nor the significant differences of judicial attitude on the Court
that most probably arose from the several appointments made by Mr.
Nixon following his campaign against the Court in 1968.
The de jure foundations of the Southern desegregation cases were
less reliable as one moved north and west, discoverable only piecemeal
in the actual practices of particular school districts, rather than observable in statutes. The attempt to provide school desegregation remedies
that correspond to specific racial wrongs of school boards (as distinct
from racial wrongs by realty boards or by other private or public entities) strained remedial powers and remedial legitimacy. The impact on
race-related income differences affecting housing choices, the capacity
of private families to secure resegregation by moving to nearby districts, the attentuation of constitutional justification to mandate desegregation across district lines (or across city or county lines), the
disputable efficacy of directing tax fund expenditures for transportation (rather than, say, for improved or for superior close-by schools)all of these factors complicated the principal post-Swann cases. 10
Sometimes undercut by Congress, infrequently assisted by the executive department, massively resisted North and South, and-most of
all-stretched ever more thinly from the constitutional underpinnings
of Brown itself, the limits of school integration and the Supreme Court
are recapitulated with skillful, lawyerlike discussions and full presentation of the relevant facts. In brief, this book is commendable because it
does what its title tells us it will do. In doing that task quite well, it
fmds no duplication elsewhere in the enormous literature that otherwise overlaps it.
To be sure, virtually all of Mr. Wilkinson's writing is "borrowed"-one may readily fmd some previously published source for
nearly everything he offers us. But there is no fault in this, and the
several hundred footnotes (inconveniently gathered in the back of the
book) are faithful both in reporting the author's sources and in indicating the impressive variety of published works he has drawn upon. In
essence, he has culled from a very bulky literature, reorganized much
10. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 u.s. 189 (1973).
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pertinent information to outfit a case law discussion that might otherwise have suffered from professional parochialism, and produced a
more streamlined product reflecting a superior understanding of his
subject as a whole. Commendably, too, he is often at pains to give the
strongest arguments on both sides of each major case and development;
that some of the strongest arguments originate in a book by an Alexander Bickel, or in an article by a Herbert Wechsler or a Charles Black
(rather than in an original fancy of Mr. Wilkinson), is a credit to his
own professionalism. This is, after all, not a new or unaddressed subject. That individuals who have personally read the cross-disciplinary
literature related to Brown v. Board of Education during the past two
decades may fmd few surprises here is quite beside the point.
Despite its excellent qualities, however, From Brown to Bakke
also poses a severe problem for the reader. Its substantive excellence is
too often obscured by a jejune style. Mr. Wilkinson may have thought
that a more straightforward exposition, unaccompanied by homilies
and melodrama, would have been insufficiently interesting. If so, I
think he was greatly mistaken. Rather, what is otherwise a straightforward book was compromised by a failure to keep the presentation lean
and unadorned.
From the outset, the author attempts to make more of things than
a serious reader knows to be appropriate. Hyperbole is everywhere.
Herbert Wechsler becomes "a high priest of academia." 11 Professor
Wechsler does not merely raise serious questions about some unaddressed matters in the original Brown opinion; rather he is said to "accuse the Court . . . of original sin." 12 It was not merely notable that
Thurgood Marshall argued the case; rather we are heavily informed
that, in doing so, Marshall thereby signified to "his people" that
"blacks in their own destiny would henceforth have a say." 13 The appearance of John Davis on the other side is likewise lyricized in Homeric fashion: "Like a rock he stood for segregation," 14 and "[l]ike
Robert E . .Eee, Davis went the path of ennobling defeat, a testament to
the South's ability to recruit men of character and principle to its most
woeful cause." 15 The Brown decision was not only unusually spare for
an opinion of such moment; rather, we are told that it possibly reflected
"questionable means," 16 "untoward methods," 17 contained "the most
II. J. WILKINSON 34.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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inflammatory English ever in fme print," 18 and failed "to lift the nation
to the magnificence of the principle that it had that day redeemed." 19
While the author castigates the unanimity of Brown because the Justices avoided separate concurrences or dissents (which Mr. Wilkinson
inaccurately declares broke with "the Court's most hallowed tradition:
that of open and spirited dissent" 20), ironically he rebukes Bakke21 for
precisely the opposite alleged defect, ie., such an array of differing
opinions (six in all) that we are told it was in fact "a brokered judgment."22 Occasionally saying more than his footnotes or sources will
support, Mr. Wilkinson volunteers his view that "[t]he Court's own task
in Bakke was to avoid a conclusive outcome,"23 a suggestion that will
lift the spirits of lay cynics (but is quite the opposite of my impression
from correspondence with two of the Justices, namely, that there was
very genuine regret over the Justices' inability to reach accord in the
case). Not wholly above the "defense" that injures, moreover, he writes
of the pivotal opinion in Bakke by Mr. Justice Powell (for whom he
once clerked): "[T]o call Powell's approach dissembling is not quite
fair." 24
These and other unsuccessful flights of rhetoric and gratuitous
description produce an overall schizophrenia in this book. A great
number of people are deeply interested in responsible factual accounts
of the judiciary's involvement in school desegregation. In the main,
when Mr. Wilkinson stuck to that task, drawing very competently from
a great deal of the intelligent literature which illuminates that involvement, he did very well indeed; the middle chapters are solid, compact
descriptions of highly complicated events fully worth one's time and
interest. It is in his attempts at punditry, and in his ambition to make
the book a piece of Southern literature as well, that Mr. Wilkinson does
not do well, turning bad and even embarrassing at times. There is a
suggestion that Mr. Wilkinson teetered between trades as an academic
and as a journalist. He is very good as an academic, judging by the
central portions of this book (as well as previous articles in a number of
law reviews 25 ). We should look forward to his return.
18. /d.at31.
19. /d. at 29.
20. /d. at 30.
21. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
22. J. WILKINSON 298.
23. /d.
24. /d. at 304.
25. See, e.g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-197a·
A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485 (1978); Wilkinson, Mr. Justice Powell· An Overview,
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Counting by Race26 is a provocative complement to From Brown
to Bakke; it takes up essentially where the other ends. Mr. Wilkinson's
book is devoted to a critical review of the Supreme Court's indefatigable efforts to stop state and local governments from counting by race in
ways that have been baneful to blacks-in directing where children
shall attend school, where they are to fmd seats on buses, whom they
may marry, and where they may eat. Eastland (a journalist) and Bennett (Director of the National Humanities Center) direct their attention
to the new instrumentalism of racial justice: counting by race to guarantee a minimum complement of government contracts, jobs, university seats, promotions, visible offices of public power, and other
concrete examples of success for blacks, Chicanos, Indians, and other
minorities.
The prematurity of announcing a "colorblind" Constitution has
seemed self-evident to many observers. No case has ever held that race
is a forbidden classification per se, no clear language (or "history") of
the fourteenth amendment compels such a holding, and the sudden discovery of such a rule by a (predominantly white) Supreme Court might
well appear to carry implications of (white) majoritarian double-dealing, self-servingly heedless of what past racial abuses have wrought.
Eastland and Bennett also recall Lyndon Johnson's commencement address at Howard University in 1965 as a very forceful statement of the
case for mandating racial minority preferences:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a
race and then say, "You are free to compete with all the others,"
and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.
Thus, it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity.
All of our citizens must have the ability to walk through those
gates.
This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for
civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity-not just
legal equity . . . not just equality as a right and a theory, but
equality as a fact and as a resultY
Indeed, the case for providing racial minority preferences in both
the public and private sectors has seemed so compelling that in the
recent Bakke case, not one of the more than sixty briefs urged a totally
colorblind interpretation of the fourteenth amendment-and virtually
11 RicH. L. REV. 259 (1977); Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protectionfor Personal Lifestyles,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977).
26. T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT, COUNTING BY RACE: EQUALITY FROM THE FOUNDING
FATHERS TO BAKKE AND WEBER {1979) [hereinafter cited as T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT).
27. Quoted in id. at 6 (emphasis added by Eastland & Bennett).
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every "establishment" group filing as a friend of court urged the Court
to sustain the constitutionality of separate and more permissive admission standards that provided sixteen percent more minority students (in
addition to the fourteen percent who made it into the Davis Medical
School pursuant to the regular admissions process). Among these
groups were the American Bar Association, the Association of American Law Schools, and the American Association of University Professors.
Eastland and Bennett are fully aware of these things, yet they are
not exactly overwhehned by them. Thus, having labored over those
three-score briefs, they suggest:
The briefs in the Bakke q15e are full of efforts to distinguish between this "test" and that by which racial classifications are said
to be valid or invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment; one
reads of "rational relationship tests," "compelling interest tests,"
"intermediate balance tests," and yet others. It is possible to get
lost in the sea of tests . . . .28
And the authors are likewise warranted in noting that the consensus of
compassionate opinion itself has not been entirely stable. Not only is it
true that general polls (which produce consistent results both within
minorities and in the population at large) disapprove the licitness of
certifying individuals by racial tests for purposes of applying different
standards of eligibility for employment, promotion, admission, or contracts, but just three decades ago 187law professors urged as amicus in
the same Supreme Court that "the Equal Protection Clause makes racial classifications unreasonable per se."29 Earlier still, moreover, just
as some racial Reconstruction legislation specifically benefited blacks
(as there was also some that disadvantaged them-such as that which
segregated the public schools in the District of Columbia), there had
been soundings in favor of a categorical imperative, altogether forbidding government to use race as a basis for treating persons differently.
The authors well remember Justice Harlan for his dissenting voice in
Plessy:
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights all citizens are
equal before the law.... The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.30
28.
29.
30.
LAND &

Id. at 20.
Quoted in id. at 102.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in T. EASTW. BENNETT at 83.
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As Eastland and Bennett recall, that position seemed very close to what
Richard Cain, a black who represented North Carolina in the House,
endorsed in 1875: "We do not want any discriminations. I do not ask
any legislation for the colored people of this country that is not applied
to the white people. All that we ask is equal laws, equal legislation,
and equal rights throughout the length and breadth of this land."31
And they recall too that Ale:J_Cander Bickel, scholarly exponent of judicial conservatism, had presumed to derive from the Warren Court
much the same thought. Thus, they quote Bickel from his last work:
''The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson
of contemporary history have been the same at least for a generation:
discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, and unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society."32
Eastland and Bennett leave no doubt of their own position and
find within a variety of (separate and unequal) affirmative action arrangements an inadvertent tendency to confirm racial stereotypes. The
diversity the Davis plan produced, they note by way of example, was
not a racial diversity among equals but a racial diversity among students performing nationally within the ninetieth percentile of a test
(which the medical school felt sufficiently reliable to count in significant measure for all regular applicants), and racially different students
within the thirtieth percentile of the same test. The diversity was thus
not among racially diverse and educationally equivalent students but
among educationally mismatched students.33
Their point, written larger, is a disturbing one. An individual selected by race to perform work that he or she may even assuredly be
"qualified" to do-but according to the government's own usual standards, not as well qualified as another-may at once possess the emoluments of "equality as a fact and as a result" (which President Johnson
sought), but neither the respect nor credibility of that prescribed equality. Indeed, the risk may not be a trivial one that proliferation of such
arrangements may itself operate to inculcate a renewed (and, alas, an
empirically based) expectation by others that the race of an individual
bespeaks a probability of on-the-job inferiority: that the race of the
individual whom one confronts across a policeman's desk, a lathe, a
shop counter, or an operating table evidences some uncertain degree of
31. Quoted in T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETf, at 91.
32. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975), quoted in T. EASTLAND & W. BENNETT at 183.
33. Eastland and Bennett discuss this point in Chapter 8 of Counting by Race, which is entitled "Create in Him a Habit of Dependence" and subtitled ''The Case Against Numerical Equality."

1496

Desegregation and Affirmative Action
lesser skill, troubling one's confidence and simultaneously stigmatizing
all other persons of the same race holding equivalent positions, though
few (if any) of those others may have achieved their statuses other than
by a commendable combination of skill and work. The point is not one
that can be brushed aside as a contrivance of hostility to affirmative
action. It is at least as old as Hans Christian Anderson's fable of The
Emperor's New Clothes.34
One may earnestly respond that the degree and extent of race-designated minimum set-asides, quotas, or whatever may be superintended to avoid severe mismatching, but the means to
"constitutionalize" the limits of permissible differences are quite a different matter. Political processes clearly will not do it; what Phoenix
may resist in ordering racial shares, Berkeley or Detroit may fmd altogether right. What Minneapolis may think to be a sufficient additional
"minority contractors" set-aside, the District of Columbia may elect to
expand to twenty-five percent or more (and has, in fact, already done
so). Moreover, insofar as one group succeeds in securing a racially designated share of fixed resources, the political pressure (and propriety)
of other groups' "resegregating" by race as special race-propelled interest groups, becomes heightened. It may, as Bickel suggested, yield a
dis-integrative politics, racially reorganized political interest groups,
thoroughly "destructive of democratic society." There may, indeed, be
much wisdom in borrowing from the observation Mr. Justice Jackson
offered in a related context: "It seems trite but necessary to say that
. . . our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding
these beginnings."35
The Eastland-Bennett essay on Counting by Race must not, however, be read in isolation. While thoughtful and highly readable, it is
sufficiently committed to expounding the unwisdom of societies that
count by race that lawyers and laymen alike should want to read a
good deal else as well. Two of the best of such readings doubtless include Thurgood Marshall's powerful partial concurrence in the Bakke
case36 and Judge Hastie's address, "Affirmative Action in Vindicating
Civil Rights.'m That both authors are black, that each is well over
34. I once asked a colleague who is genuinely committed to race-preference varieties of affirmative action whether it would be a datum of indifference to know the race of a university
clinic physician assigned to assist him. The response, a bit slow in coming, was that it would make
no difference, assuming only that the physician were over the age of 35-no minority-race physician of such age was likely to have been an "affirmative action" doctor.
35. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (Jackson, J.).
36. Regents of the Univ. of CaL v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,387-402 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. Hastie, Affirmative Action in Vindicating Civil Rights, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 502.
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thirty-five (and plainly earned his way to the reputation he acquired in
the law long before affirmative action was fashionable), and that both
regard it as premature to read the Constitution even now as colorblind,
may make their writings especially worth considering. 38

38. For my views on the topic, see Van Alstyne, Rites o/ Passage: Race, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1979).
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